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Abstract
We document the cyclical behavior of debt, equity, and retained earnings for different ﬁrm
categories using ﬁrm-level Canadian data. There is evidence of both procyclical equity and debt
issuance for all ﬁrm categories but the timing differs. In particular, there is strong evidence that
equity issuance increases in anticipation of an expansion. During this phase, some substitution
between debt and equity takes place. After the expansion has reached its peak, equity issuance
starts to decrease and during this phase there is strong evidence of procyclical debt issuance and
some substitution out of equity seems to take place. Retained earnings is procyclical except for
small ﬁrms.
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, G32
Bank classiﬁcation: Business ﬂuctuations and cycles
Résumé
Au moyen de données recueillies à l’échelon de l’entreprise puis regroupées par taille
d’entreprise, les auteurs étudient le comportement cyclique des émissions d’obligations et
d’actions et des bénéﬁces non répartis des sociétés canadiennes. L’analyse de ces données indique
que les émissions d’obligations et d’actions présentent un caractère procyclique peu importe la
catégorie de taille examinée, mais qu’elles s’échelonnent différemment dans le temps. Elle révèle
en particulier que le volume des actions émises augmente à l’approche d’une phase d’expansion,
aux dépens de l’émission d’obligations. Passé le pic du cycle d’expansion, l’émission d’actions
diminue et semble céder graduellement la place à l’émission d’obligations, dont le caractère
procyclique se manifeste alors. Les bénéﬁces non répartis afﬁchent un comportement procyclique,
sauf dans le cas des petites entreprises.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E32, G32
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cycles et ﬂuctuations économiques1 Introduction
Cyclical changes in the availability of external ﬁnancing play an important role in modern
business cycle research. Exemplary theoretical papers are Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). All three
papers only allow for debt as external ﬁnancing. In a recent paper, Fama and French
(2005) document that ﬁrms frequently issue equity and that equity ﬁnance does have an
important role in ﬁrm ﬁnancing. One may, thus, get an incomplete or even misleading
picture by ignoring possible cyclical changes in equity ﬁnance.
Several theoretical models have been developed to study the cyclical behavior of equity
ﬁnance. With multiple ﬁnancing sources the cyclical behavior of individual ﬁnancing
sources is harder to determine, because increased agency problems during a recession can
still lead to an increase in a ﬁnancing source if it is used as a substitute for another ﬁnancing
source, for which the worsening of agency problems is even more severe. So perhaps not
surprisingly, the predictions of the existing models diﬀer. The models in Covas and den
Haan (2006) and Jermann and Quadrini (2006) predict that debt issuance is procyclical,
whereas according to the model of Levy and Hennessy (2006) that is only the case for ﬁrms
facing tight ﬁnancing constraints. The models also have diﬀerences regarding the cyclical
behavior of equity. Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), Levy and Hennessy (2006), and
Covas and den Haan (2006) argue that equity issuance is procyclical, whereas Jermann
and Quadrini (2006) argue that equity issuance should be countercyclical.
The empirical results of Fama and French (2005) are likely to stimulate other re-
searchers to allow for equity ﬁnance in their models. Moreover, the development of the
ﬁnancial sector means that models that only consider debt ﬁnancing are getting outdated.
Empirical research to guide the theoretical work is clearly needed. There are a few em-
pirical studies that analyze the cyclical behavior of equity using US data. In particular,
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), Korajczyk and Levy (2003) ﬁnd equity to be procyclical
and Jermann and Quadrini (2006) ﬁnd equity to be countercyclical. Covas and den Haan
(2006) argue that the ambiguous results are due to the use of aggregate data. In contrast
to the other empirical studies that rely on aggregate data, Covas and den Haan (2006)
1use US data by ﬁrm size and argue that both predictions are right. That is, although
equity issuance is procyclical for most ﬁrm groups, equity issuance is countercyclical for
the largest ﬁrms, that is, ﬁrms in the top 1% or possibly top 5% in terms of the book value
of assets. Given the highly skewed distribution of asset size, the relatively small group of
large ﬁrms is important for aggregate ﬂuctuations. Whether the procyclical behavior of
the smaller ﬁrms or the countercyclical behavior of the largest ﬁrms dominate the cyclical
behavior at the aggregate level (or that they roughly oﬀ set each other) depends crucially
on particular choices such as the deﬁnition of the series and the sample period.
Here we follow the strategy of Covas and den Haan (2006) of using ﬁrm-level data in
analyzing the cyclical behavior of ﬁnancing sources for Canadian ﬁrms. Canadian data
not only oﬀer a fresh perspective to investigate the cyclical behavior of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing
sources, but are also more comprehensive than its US counterpart, Compustat, in that
several private ﬁrms are included as well.
The results we ﬁnd using Canadian data correspond closely to those found with US
data, but there are some exceptions. Our ﬁrst result is that equity is procyclical. Like
the results for the US we ﬁnd that the procyclical changes in equity are decreasing with
ﬁrm size, but in contrast to the US results, we ﬁnd equity issuance to be procyclical for
the largest ﬁrms as well. When using the contemporaneous correlation between debt and
real activity, most results indicate that debt ﬁnancing is procyclical although the results
are not as strong as those for the US.
When we pay careful attention to the timing, then a strong cyclical pattern emerges.
In particular, we ﬁnd that equity is leading and debt is lagging the cycle. Similar eﬀect
was found for the US but it is stronger for Canada. In anticipation of an expansion (both
in terms of ﬁrms’ assets or aggregate real activity), ﬁrms issue equity. During this phase,
some substitution between debt and equity takes place, because we ﬁnd some evidence
of negative comovement between debt and next year’s real activity. After the expansion
has reached its peak, equity issuance starts to decrease and during this phase there is
strong evidence of procyclical debt issuance. A possible interpretation is that positive
expectations make it easier for ﬁrms to attract equity but that they can only attract
2additional debt after they have built up additional net worth.
This paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses the data sources and
the methods used to construct cyclical components. The third section discusses the results
and the last section concludes.
2 Constructing the data
2.1 Data sources
Our ﬁrst and main data set consists of the annual Report on Business (ROB) data from
1979 to 2004.1 About two-thirds of the data consists of ﬁrms listed on two Canadian stock
exchanges (Toronto and Montreal Stock Exchanges) and senior board companies from four
other stock exchanges (Vancouver, Alberta, Winnipeg and the Canadian Venture stock
exchanges).2 The remaining one-third of the sample consists of private ﬁrms. Some private
ﬁrms are quite large.3 We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms (activity index 13) and utilities (10) and
we require companies to have a non-foreign incorporation code.4 To deﬂate nominal series
we use the producer price index, since we want to capture the purchasing power of the
funds raised.
This data set allows us to condition on ﬁrm size. To study the importance of ﬁrm size,
we rank ﬁrms using last period’s end-of-period book value of assets. We construct J ﬁrm
categories. A ﬁrm group, j ∈ {1,...,J}, is deﬁned by a lower and an upper percentile. Our
ﬁrm groups are [0,25%], [0,50%], [0,75%], [0,99%], [90%,94%], [95%,99%], and [99%,100%].
The behavior of the larger ﬁrms has a signiﬁcant impact on the aggregate variables. To
study the role of large ﬁrms in inﬂuencing the aggregate statistics, we consider several
1See the appendix for details.
2Firms are typically included in the data set for several years before they go public. Consequently, our
data does include equity raised through IPOs.
3Large private ﬁrms tend to be subsidiaries of multinationals. Examples of private ﬁrms that are large
in terms of assets are Imperial Tobacco Canada, Ford Motor Company of Canada, and General Motors of
Canada.
4Financial ﬁrms and utilities are typically excluded because the regulations aﬀecting these ﬁrms sets
them apart from other ﬁrms.
3groups in the top decile.
Table 1 provides a set of summary statistics for each of these ﬁrm groups. In particular,
we ﬁnd that smaller ﬁrms have lower leverage and exhibit higher asset growth. Smaller
ﬁrms ﬁnance a much larger fraction of asset growth with equity, whereas larger ﬁrms
ﬁnance a larger fraction with debt. For large US ﬁrms we ﬁnd retained earnings to be
important but this is not the case for Canadian ﬁrms.
The second data set consists of net new security issues from 1980 to 2004 for all non-
ﬁnancial corporations, excluding government enterprises. It is from Statscan’s Financial
Flow Accounts. An advantage of this data set is that the Financial Flow Accounts includes
more private ﬁrms than ROB.5 A disadvantage is that it does not allow us to decompose
the series by ﬁrm size.
2.2 Variables used
The ROB equity variables used are
1. Sale of stock,
2. Sale of stock minus repurchase of stock, and
3. Change in equity, measured as the residual from the accounting identity using the
deﬁnition of Fama and French (2005). This increase is not aﬀected by retained earn-
ings because accumulated retained earnings are kept track of in a separate balance
sheet item.
Our preferred choices for equity issuance are the sale of stock, i.e., the gross issuance
of equity, and the change in equity. The ﬁrst is most cleanly deﬁned and the latter is a
comprehensive measure of net stock issuance.
To compare the diﬀerence between the gross sale of stock and the net change in equity,
we plot in Panels A and B of Figure 1, the sale of stock and the change in the book value of
equity for the bottom 25% and for all ﬁrms, respectively. For the bottom 25% the two series
5ROB’s coverage does include the largest private ﬁrms in Canada in addition to several smaller private
ﬁrms.
4are very close. This is not surprising because sale of stock is the main instrument through
which small ﬁrms raise equity and they rarely repurchase stock. Panel B documents that
the same is true when we use the aggregate series except for the period between 1987 and
1994 when the total change in equity is remarkably lower than the sale of stock series,
indicating that repurchases were important for larger ﬁrms during this period. Panel C
compares the diﬀerence between the net-sale-of-stock measure and the change in equity,
again at the aggregate level. It also makes clear that the gap between gross sale of stock
and the net change in equity between 1987 and 1994 is due to increased repurchases, since
net sales and the net change in equity are very similar during this period. Interestingly,
Panel C also shows that net sales and the net change are fairly similar up to 1994 but
that in the last decade of the sample the change in equity is substantially above the net
sale measure (and as documented in Panel B roughly equal to the gross sale measure).
This means that during the last decade of the sample other forms of equity have been
important and of roughly equal magnitude as repurchases.
The ROB debt variables used are
1. Bank debt,
2. Issuance of long-term debt minus reduction in long-term debt, and
3. Change in total liabilities.
The ﬁrst debt measure is the “bank debt” measure from ROB, which in addition to
bank debt also includes short-term notes and small loans. The last debt measure follows
Fama and French (2005) in deﬁning net debt issues as the change in total liabilities.
For ROB retained earnings we use the balance sheet item for retained earnings. Finally,
for leverage we look at
1. Total liabilities over book value of assets,
2. Short-term plus long-term debt over book value of assets, and
3. Long-term debt over assets.
5For the Financial Flow Accounts data we focus on new equity issues (gross and net)
and new bonds issues (gross and net).
2.3 Flow and level approach
We rely on two diﬀerent types of statistics. The ﬁrst type of statistic measures the cor-
relation between real GDP and ﬁnancing ﬂows, i.e., net or gross amounts of funds raised
during a period. This is the “ﬂow approach”. The second type of statistics measures the
correlation between real GDP and the level of accumulated funds raised. This is the “level
approach”.
2.3.1 Flow approach
Fama and French (2005) scale ﬂows, such as the sale of stock, by the book value of
assets. Using the actual asset value is not appropriate if one wants to document the
cyclical behavior of ﬁnancing sources. For example, equity issuance scaled by assets can
be countercyclical, even if equity issuance is procyclical as long as the increase in assets
dominates. Therefore, we scale by a deterministic trend value of assets, that is obtained







Note that the ﬁrm groups in period t are constructed using the book values of assets
observed at the end of period t − 1, i.e., using beginning-of-period t asset values.
The trend value of At(j) is denoted by AT
t (j). As an example of how variables are
constructed in the ﬂow approach consider the net change in equity.6 It is deﬁned as
6Suppose that for a particular ﬁrm i
∗ there is no observation for equity in period t, for example, because




i∗,t−1 = 0 in the construction of F
E
t (j) in Equation (2).
Note that this ﬁrm is still used to determine the ranking in period t. For example, suppose ﬁrm i
∗ is in
the bottom 25% at the end of period t − 1 and is taken over by ﬁrm i
0 which is in the top 33%. Then
the disappearance of ﬁrm i
∗ does not imply a reduction in equity for the bottom 25%. It would imply an










Note that we loose one observation when calculating the change. For comparison, we
calculate correlation coeﬃcients for all measures over the same sample, which starts in
1980 and ends in 2004. For several variables, FE
t (j) still has a trend. Therefore, we use
the HP ﬁlter to detrend the series but similar results are obtained if we take out a linear
trend. For annual data we set the smoothing parameter of the HP ﬁlter equal to 100.
2.3.2 The level approach
The advantage of the ﬂow approach is that it focuses on the amount of funds raised each
period. The disadvantage of the series constructed this way is that they display at times
some hectic swings. This is not surprising given that—by focusing on the change in ﬁrm
ﬁnancing variables—it emphasizes the higher frequency movements.
As an alternative, we use the level approach, with which we construct time series that
represent the accumulated amount of funds raised by ﬁrms in a particular group. As an
example, we show how to construct the series when equity issuance is deﬁned as the change
in the book value of equity.







where j1 is the set of ﬁrms in group j in period 1. In future periods, we have
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t (j) is logged and HP ﬁltered. LE
t (j) is equal to the accumulated real value
of funds raised by ﬁrms in group j.
3 Empirical results using ROB
We start by discussing the results for the ROB data set because of its high quality and de-
tail. In particular, we discuss the cyclical behavior of equity, liabilities, retained earnings,
7and leverage.
3.1 Cyclical behavior of equity
GDP as the real activity measure. Results for equity issuance are reported in
Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 gives the results for the level approach and table 3 for the ﬂow
approach. Each table reports results for three deﬁnitions, namely the sale of stock, the
sale of stock minus repurchases, and the change in equity.
Using the level approach we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between the
cyclical components of aggregate equity issuance and GDP for all three deﬁnitions. In
particular, for the aggregate gross (net) sale of stock we ﬁnd a correlation coeﬃcient of
0.48 (0.40) and a t-statistic of 7.33 (3.91). When the change in equity is used we ﬁnd a
correlation coeﬃcient of 0.40 and a t-statistic of 4.74.
Interestingly, for all ﬁrm categories we ﬁnd a positive contemporaneous correlation.
Using a one-sided test and a 5% signiﬁcance level only four of the 24 coeﬃcients are
not signiﬁcant. Using a two-sided test seven are not signiﬁcant. Moreover, correlation is
typically stronger and more signiﬁcant when next period’s GDP is used, which suggests
that equity issuance leads the business cycle.
In Covas and den Haan (2006) we report that equity issuance in the US is also pro-
cyclical for most ﬁrm categories but that equity issuance is strongly countercyclical for the
largest ﬁrms, in particular for the top 1%. Although ﬁrms in the top 1% are only a small
fraction of the total number of ﬁrms, they are so large that their countercyclical behavior
and the procyclical behavior of most of the other ﬁrms results in inconclusive results at
the aggregate level. The distribution of ﬁrm sizes for Canadian ﬁrms is similarly skewed
(if not more so), but the behavior of the largest Canadian ﬁrms is consistent with that of
the other ﬁrms. In particular, we ﬁnd positive and highly signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients
for the top 1%. The deviating behavior for the largest US ﬁrms can be due to idiosyncratic
shocks (because there are only a few ﬁrms in the top 1%) or can be due to largest ﬁrms
behaving diﬀerently in a systematic way. That the Canadian top 1% behaves diﬀerently
from the US top 1% suggests that the diﬀerent behavior of the largest US ﬁrms is due to
8idiosyncratic shocks.
Using the ﬂow approach, we ﬁnd most contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients to be
insigniﬁcant and negative. Recall that the ﬂow approach emphasizes higher frequencies
so lower signiﬁcance levels are to be expected. Using next period’s GDP, we ﬁnd all
correlation coeﬃcients to be positive and half are signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients for the
aggregate series are highly signiﬁcant. Using last period’s GDP, we ﬁnd all correlation
coeﬃcients to be negative and again highly signiﬁcant at the aggregate level. A possible
interpretation is that ﬁrms expand in anticipation of an expansion and that they ﬁnance
this at least partly with increased equity issuance. As the expansion really has taken oﬀ,
ﬁrms reduce the equity position, for example, by repurchasing shares.
Cyclical magnitudes. Panels A, B, and C of Figure 2 plot the cyclical component
of the sale of stock (level approach) and GDP for ﬁrms in the bottom 25%, the bottom
75%, and the bottom 95%, respectively. The following observations can be made. First,
the positive comovement between equity issuance and real activity is clear although there
are episodes when equity and GDP move in opposite directions. For example, following
the recession in the early eighties equity issuance by ﬁrms in the bottom 25% and to some
extent the bottom 75% continued to decline when GDP recovered. Equity issuance only
started to increase just before GDP—after a minor relapse—started a sharp increase in
the mid eighties. When we look at equity issuance of the bottom 95% then we do not
see such a delay. Equity issuance by all three ﬁrm categories also seem to “ignore” the
temporary growth slow down observed in the mid nineties. Figures 3 and 4 show that a
very similar picture is obtained when using the net sale of stock and the change in equity
deﬁnition.
Figure 5 plots the cyclical components of GDP and equity issuance for the top 1
per cent. These series display some hectic swings which isn’t surprising given that on
average only 14 ﬁrms are in this group. Interestingly, after the economic downturn of the
early eighties equity issuance by the top 1 per cent does increase with GDP whereas, as
discussed above, equity issuance by the other ﬁrm categories was still decreasing. Also
equity issuance by the largest ﬁrms reaches a trough during or just before the growth slow
9down in the mid nineties whereas other ﬁrm categories did not.
Assets as the real activity measure. In the bottom panels of Tables 2 & 3 we
report the comovement of equity issuance and assets. Covas and den Haan (2006) ﬁnd
using US data that the procyclical properties of equity issuance are much stronger and
more signiﬁcant when ﬁrm assets are used as the real activity measure. It is clear that the
same is true for Canadian ﬁrms when we consider the bottom 25%, the bottom 50%, and
the bottom 75% independent of whether the ﬂow or the level approach is used. Moreover,
above we found for these three ﬁrm categories evidence of negative comovement when
lagged GDP and the ﬂow approach are used. Those results are clearly not there when
assets are used instead of GDP. In particular, the correlation of all three equity measures
with last year’s, this year’s, and next year’s assets is strong, positive, and highly signiﬁcant
for the bottom 25%, bottom 50%, and the bottom 75%.
At the aggregate level we ﬁnd a pattern that is very similar to that found using GDP
as the real activity measure. That is, using next year’s assets we ﬁnd for all three equity
measures and both the level and the ﬂow approach highly signiﬁcant positive comovement,
whereas using last year’s assets we ﬁnd four signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients but also two
insigniﬁcant positive coeﬃcients.
For the other ﬁrm categories the results either weaken or strengthen depending on
the approach or measure of equity issuance considered. For example, when we consider
the bottom 99% and the ﬂow approach then the contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients
obtained are now signiﬁcantly positive. For the level approach and again the bottom
99% there is some weakening (t-statistic for net sale of stock drops to 1.62) and some
strengthening (t-statistic for change in equity increases to 4.85).
3.2 Cyclical behavior of debt
GDP as the real activity measure. In this section, we look at the correlation
of GDP with several debt categories. In particular, we look at change in bank debt, net
issuance of long-term debt, and change in total liabilities. We use again the level and the
10ﬂow approach and correlation coeﬃcients are given in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
Covas and den Haan (2006) ﬁnd using US data strong evidence of procyclical debt
issuance for diﬀerent debt measures and for all ﬁrm categories except the top 1%. More-
over, cyclical patterns are stronger when lagged GDP is used, that is, debt issuance is
lagging GDP. For the ﬂow approach the results are similar to those found for the US.
That is, we ﬁnd positive correlation coeﬃcients of which many are highly signiﬁcant for
all three debt measures and across all ﬁrm categories. As for US data, we ﬁnd for large
ﬁrms occasionally a negative coeﬃcient when next year’s GDP is used.
Using the level approach, we ﬁnd again positive coeﬃcients for all three measures
and all ﬁrm categories when lagged GDP is used. Most are signiﬁcant and several are
highly signiﬁcant. The results are mixed, however, when we consider the contemporaneous
correlation. Using short-term debt, debt issuance is clearly positively correlated with
current GDP, except for the bottom 25%. The results are inconclusive for the change in
liabilities although the two negative coeﬃcients found are small. For the net change in long-
term debt there are several negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the contemporaneous
correlation.
A possible interpretation is the following. The positive contemporaneous correlation
coeﬃcients found with the ﬂow approach suggest that Canadian ﬁrms increase debt ﬁ-
nancing as the economy recovers. The positive contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients
for short-term debt and total liabilities using the level approach suggest that this does lead
to a sharp increase in the corresponding debt levels. The negative (positive) correlation
between long-term debt levels and contemporaneous (lagged) GDP suggest that it takes
Canadian ﬁrms longer than US ﬁrms to build up long-term debt levels.
Cyclical magnitudes. In Figures 7 through 9 we plot the cyclical components of
debt issuance for diﬀerent ﬁrm categories and diﬀerent debt measures for the level ap-
proach. The ﬁgures highlight two diﬀerences with the results for US ﬁrms. The ﬁrst is
that although there is some evidence for procyclical debt issuance in Canada, the evidence
is not as strong as it is for US ﬁrms. Second, whereas for the US we ﬁnd a strong corre-
lation of debt issuance across the diﬀerent ﬁrm categories, this is less true for Canadian
11ﬁrms.
Assets as the real activity measure. When we use assets as the real activity
measure then the results are much more robust. That is, just like we ﬁnd for US ﬁrms,
debt issuance is strongly procyclical and highly signiﬁcant across ﬁrm categories for both
the level and the ﬂow approach and for all three debt measures. These results also suggest
that debt is lagging the cycle.
3.3 Co-movement of equity and debt
In Table 6, we document the comovement between equity and debt issuance. For the
bottom 25%, the bottom 50%, and the bottom 75% the results are similar to those we ﬁnd
using US data. That is, equity issuance and debt issuance are positively correlated. Most
coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant for both the level and the ﬂow approach. For larger ﬁrms
the results are mixed. There are both positive as well as negative statistically signiﬁcant
correlations, depending on the particular measure used and the lead/lags considered. For
example, using the most comprehensive measures, namely the change in equity and the
change in total liabilities, we ﬁnd using the level approach a signiﬁcant positive correlation
at the aggregate level. Using net equity and net long-term debt, however, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient.
3.4 Cyclical behavior of retained earnings, proﬁts, and dividends
In Table 7, we report the cyclical behavior of retained earnings, proﬁts, and dividends.
We only report results for the ﬂow approach. Retained earnings for the bottom 25% is on
average negative, which is a problem for the level approach since it requires taking logs.
The results we ﬁnd for Canadian ﬁrms very closely resemble those obtained with US
data. First, as documented in Table 7, size is very important for understanding the
cyclical behavior of proﬁts and retained earnings. Whereas, proﬁts and retained earnings
are acyclical for small ﬁrms, they are procyclical for large ﬁrms. Proﬁts and thus retained
earnings are possibly depressed for small ﬁrms during economic expansions because small
12ﬁrms accelerate their expansion during these periods. When assets are used as the real
activity measure we ﬁnd a similar pattern.
3.5 Cyclical behavior of leverage
In the corporate ﬁnance literature, leverage plays a prominent role. For business cycle
analysis this variable is less interesting because then the key question is whether ﬁrms’
ﬁnancing sources, debt, equity, and retained earnings increase with the cycle. Changes in
leverage reveal only what happens with debt relative to equity.
For completeness, we also report results on the empirical behavior of leverage deﬁned
using the book value of equity. Table 8 reports using the level approach the cyclical
behavior for the three measures we consider. Those are total liabilities to the book value
of assets, short-term plus long-term debt to the book value of assets, and long-term debt
to the book value of assets.
No clear picture about the cyclical behavior of leverage emerges. This isn’t too surpris-
ing given that equity and debt both tend to be procyclical. Leverage is countercyclical and
signiﬁcant for all three deﬁnitions when aggregate variables are used and GDP is used as
the cyclical indicator. This result is driven by large ﬁrms. When we consider the bottom
25%, 50%, and 75% then we do not ﬁnd a single signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient but we do
ﬁnd some positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Also note that the leverage ratio between large
and small ﬁrms is quite diﬀerent. Table 1 shows that the leverage ratio for the bottom
25% is 0.35 while it is 0.74 for the top 1%. The lower the leverage ratio, the larger the
diﬀerence between the amount of equity and debt raised has to be in order to generate a
decrease in leverage.
The quite strong result at the aggregate level is not robust to using assets instead of
GDP as the real activity measure. Now leverage is signiﬁcantly positive for two of the three
measures for leverage. Again large ﬁrms are important for this result. This suggests that
large ﬁrms decrease their leverage when their own expansion coincides with an expansion
of overall economic activity but that they increase leverage if their own expansion does
not coincide with an economic boom.
134 Results for the ﬁnancial ﬂow accounts
In this section, we compare some of our results with aggregate data on new issues of
preferred and common stocks and corporate bonds compiled by the Bank of Canada and
distributed by Statistics Canada. An advantage of this data set is that it is available at
quarterly frequency. The sample period starts in 1980 and ends in 2004.
Figure 11 plots the cyclical components of GDP and the gross and net new equity issues
constructed using the level approach.7 The ﬁgure documents the procyclical behavior
of equity issuance, especially for the gross measure. The contemporaneous correlation
between gross (net) new equity issues and output is 0.44 (0.37) and the t-statistic is equal
to 3.96 (2.38).8 Similar to the ROB data, equity issuance doesn’t follow the increase in the
cyclical component of GDP after the recession in the early eighties until 1985 just GDP
takes oﬀ after a temporary dip. The correlation for the gross issues over the period from
1989 and 2004 is indeed stronger and equal to 0.70 with a t-statistic equal to 7.38.
For the new issues of corporate bonds the results are similar to the ones obtained
from the data set on ﬁrm level data using long-term debt. Recall that long-term debt
was the debt measure for which results were not robust and switched sign depending on
the method to construct the series. Here we ﬁnd small and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients with
both methods. Figure 12 plots the cyclical component of the gross and net debt series
together with the cyclical GDP measure. No strong pattern of any kind seems to emerge.
The contemporaneous correlation between gross (net) debt issues and HP ﬁltered output
is -0.01 (-0.12) and the t-statistics is equal to -0.072 (-0.742).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have used ﬁrm-level data to analyze the cyclical behavior of ﬁnancing
sources for Canadian ﬁrms. Our results are similar to the ones for US ﬁrms although there
are some exceptions. We found equity issuance to be cyclical for all size classes, whereas
7Again we use the HP ﬁlter to construct cyclical components.
8Results are insigniﬁcant when the ﬂow approach is used. These data are quarterly and the graphs
clearly show highly volatile short-term ﬂuctuations in equity issuance.
14for the US we found this not to be the case for the largest ﬁrms. The Canadian data has
several large privately held ﬁrms, not just publicly traded ﬁrms. So we can generalize our
earlier results to a universe of ﬁrms that is broader than the sample of publicly traded
ﬁrms. Most results indicated that the contemporaneous correlation between debt issuance
and the cycle is positive but the results are not as strong as that found for the US. When
looking at leads and lags, however, a cyclical pattern emerges that was also found for the
US but is much visibly stronger in Canadian data. That is, equity is leading the cycle
and debt is lagging the cycle. Moreover, as equity increases in anticipation of the cycle
debt may actually decrease and as debt increases when the cycle has reached its peak
equity may actually decrease. In Covas and den Haan (2006) we develop a theory that
can explain the broad procyclical pattern found for equity and debt issuance. The next
challenge is to develop a theory that can also closely mimic the timing.
15A Data sources & exact deﬁnitions
Output and deﬂators. Real GDP is deﬁned as the Gross domestic product expenditure-
based, chained 1997 dollars, item v1992067. The PPI is the price index for industrial
commodities, item v1574377.
Report on Business Database. Our sample starts in 1979, because before 1979 the
coverage as well as the data availability are very incomplete in ROB. Book value of assets is
total assets (ROB item totlas). Book value of liabilities is total liabilities (totlia). Sales is
total sales (tsales). Bank debt is bank indebtness (bankin). Long-term debt due in one year
is current portion of long-term debt (curltd). The remaining maturities of long-term debt
are in debt and advances (dbtadv). Issuance of long-term debt is increase in debt/advances
(incdbt). Retirement of long-term debt is reduction in long-term debt (reddbt). Gross
equity issuance is sale of company stock (salstk). Repurchases of equity is purchase of
company stock (repstk). Retained earnings includes appropriated and unappropriated
retained earnings (retear). Proﬁts is income before extraordinary items (incbei). Finally,
dividends is total dividends (divtot).
To be included in our sample we require ﬁrms to have total assets for two adjacent
ﬁscal years. We excluded ﬁrms with a foreign incorporation code (inccnty), as well as
utilities (activityndx = 10) and ﬁnancial ﬁrms (13). We excluded private ﬁrms that report
a book value of assets equal to zero. Some private ﬁrms only disclose some information
to ROB, specially foreign-owned subsidiaries, which are no longer required to ﬁle ﬁnancial
statements in Canada. Firm-years displaying sales growth of more than 100% are excluded.
This is important to eliminate coding errors and ﬁrms involved in a major merger or subject
to accounting problems and/or irregularities. Finally, we restrict the sample to ﬁrms with
a reporting period of 12 months.
Net new security issues. Gross bond issues is gross new issues of corporate bonds
(v122271). Net bond issues is gross new issues of corporate bonds net of retirements
(v122315). Gross equity issues is gross new issues of preferred plus common stock
16(v122274+v122277). Net equity issues is gross new issues of preferred plus common stocks
net of repurchases (v122318+v122321).
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18Table 1: Summary statistics for diﬀerent size classes


















[0,25%] 323 0.001 0.35 0.11 0.33 0.68 0.27 0.88 -0.15 0.94 0.11
[0,50%] 646 0.008 0.40 0.14 0.34 0.25 0.34 0.94 -0.28 1.02 0.14
[0,75%] 970 0.039 0.49 0.16 0.33 0.11 0.45 0.77 -0.22 0.88 0.22
[0,99%] 1291 0.623 0.61 0.06 0.43 0.07 0.68 0.34 -0.02 0.37 0.34
[90%,95%] 67 0.128 0.59 0.06 0.44 0.08 0.70 0.29 0.02 0.34 0.34
[95%,99%] 57 0.360 0.64 0.04 0.45 0.06 0.77 0.24 -0.01 0.24 0.35
[95%,100%] 71 0.736 0.69 0.03 0.38 0.04 0.77 0.24 -0.01 0.20 0.37
[99%,100%] 14 0.377 0.74 0.03 0.32 0.03 0.78 0.23 -0.01 0.13 0.40
All ﬁrms 1305 1 0.66 0.05 0.39 0.05 0.70 0.32 -0.02 0.32 0.35
Notes: The data set consists of annual ROB data from 1979 to 2004. The ﬁrst column gives the
average number of observations. The column size states the fraction of the total book value of
assets that belongs to that particular size class. Leverage, L
A, equals liabilities divided by assets.
Short-term debt, STD
L , equals bank indebtedness divided by total liabilities. Long-term debt,
LTD
L , equals current portion of long-term debt plus debt and advances divided by total liabilities.
Asset growth, ∆A
A , equals the change in the book value of assets from period t − 1 to t divided
by the current value of assets. Change in liabilities, ∆L equals the change in the book value of
total liabilities. Change in equity, ∆E, equals the change in stockholders’ equity minus retained
earnings. Retained earnings, ∆RE, is the change in the balance sheet item for retained earnings.
Net sale of stock, ∆S, equals sale of common and preferred stock minus repurchases and, ∆D, is
net issuance of long-term debt. For further details on the data series used, see the data appendix.
19Table 2: Cyclical behavior of equity issuance: level approach
Size classes Sale of stock and Net sale of stock and ∆ in equity and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] 0.08 0.39 0.32 0.13 0.41 0.31 0.18 0.41 0.29
(0.88) (1.80) (1.65) (1.29) (2.08) (1.87) (1.85) (1.90) (1.64)
[0,50%] 0.22 0.27 0.40 0.24 0.27 0.39 0.17 0.23 0.40
(1.97) (1.43) (3.75) (2.13) (1.51) (3.62) (1.15) (0.91) (2.90)
[0,75%] 0.22 0.48 0.54 0.22 0.47 0.53 0.18 0.39 0.45
(2.28) (2.80) (4.34) (2.16) (2.55) (3.92) (1.67) (1.49) (2.39)
[0,99%] -0.13 0.40 0.64 -0.26 0.35 0.69 -0.16 0.35 0.67
(-1.38) (4.51) (12.73) (-4.48) (2.83) (7.96) (-1.65) (3.14) (10.30)
[90,95%] 0.05 0.37 0.45 -0.10 0.36 0.60 -0.14 0.36 0.59
(0.22) (2.45) (8.00) (-0.51) (2.29) (6.14) (-0.62) (3.07) (7.26)
[95,99%] -0.33 0.27 0.56 -0.43 0.19 0.59 -0.14 0.29 0.61
(-2.33) (2.27) (8.60) (-4.69) (1.78) (7.75) (-0.93) (4.33) (6.79)
[99,100%] 0.33 0.49 0.49 0.20 0.30 0.26 0.25 0.35 0.30
(4.75) (6.71) (4.95) (2.96) (3.46) (1.88) (1.83) (3.34) (2.89)
All ﬁrms 0.02 0.48 0.65 -0.16 0.40 0.67 0.01 0.40 0.59
(0.23) (7.33) (25.91) (-2.38) (3.91) (10.68) (0.08) (4.74) (8.67)
Size classes Sale of stock and Net sale of stock and ∆ in equity and
∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1
[0,25%] 0.45 0.93 0.60 0.49 0.94 0.59 0.48 0.93 0.54
(5.09) (60.30) (15.17) (6.87) (105.19) (16.64) (7.39) (97.47) (10.62)
[0,50%] 0.63 0.93 0.54 0.65 0.94 0.53 0.63 0.93 0.53
(10.19) (45.85) (8.45) (9.65) (43.65) (8.48) (8.52) (33.93) (5.46)
[0,75%] 0.44 0.84 0.77 0.46 0.86 0.76 0.42 0.87 0.68
(5.39) (15.12) (24.60) (5.56) (18.46) (23.01) (4.46) (20.41) (8.18)
[0,99%] -0.12 0.31 0.56 -0.33 0.17 0.51 -0.06 0.40 0.57
(-1.53) (2.61) (2.67) (-3.79) (1.62) (3.08) (-0.50) (4.85) (4.12)
[90,95%] -0.06 0.31 0.34 -0.15 0.25 0.39 -0.04 0.28 0.22
(-0.51) (2.67) (2.27) (-1.85) (2.39) (2.35) (-0.69) (2.94) (0.93)
[95,99%] -0.19 0.03 0.13 -0.51 -0.18 -0.01 -0.10 0.31 0.47
(-3.61) (0.14) (0.68) (-8.44) (-0.79) (-0.02) (-0.52) (2.92) (4.68)
[99,100%] 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.34 0.31 0.20 0.73 0.78 0.53
(4.40) (6.58) (4.14) (3.26) (5.13) (3.88) (6.71) (16.39) (11.97)
All ﬁrms 0.05 0.30 0.53 -0.21 0.11 0.43 0.29 0.55 0.61
(0.81) (2.98) (3.42) (-2.17) (1.19) (4.55) (1.55) (5.05) (8.09)
Notes: All series are logged and HP ﬁltered. Sale of stock is sale of company stock (salstk). Net sale
of stock is sale of company stock minus repurchase of company stock (repstk). Change in equity
is the change in book value of equity (see text for deﬁnition). The standard errors are computed
using the VARHAC procedure in den Haan and Levin (1997) and t-statistics are in parenthesis.
The correlation coeﬃcients statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level are
highlighted in bold.
20Table 3: Cyclical behavior of equity issuance: ﬂow approach
Size classes Sale of stock and Net sale of stock and ∆ in equity and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] -0.34 0.06 0.34 -0.31 0.09 0.33 -0.23 0.12 0.32
(-2.35) (0.43) (1.46) (-2.33) (0.67) (1.25) (-1.68) (0.84) (1.34)
[0,50%] -0.22 -0.08 0.23 -0.21 -0.07 0.23 -0.22 -0.10 0.19
(-1.22) (-0.61) (0.59) (-1.10) (-0.50) (0.57) (-1.21) (-0.77) (0.49)
[0,75%] -0.29 -0.06 0.23 -0.29 -0.07 0.21 -0.26 -0.07 0.15
(-2.42) (-0.46) (0.78) (-2.41) (-0.50) (0.67) (-2.31) (-0.49) (0.54)
[0,99%] -0.58 -0.19 0.35 -0.70 -0.32 0.33 -0.52 -0.20 0.35
(-4.99) (-2.13) (9.23) (-8.54) (-3.46) (5.31) (-10.17) (-2.42) (5.34)
[90,95%] -0.28 0.00 0.30 -0.41 -0.13 0.25 -0.37 -0.05 0.38
(-1.32) (0.00) (1.50) (-2.48) (-1.17) (1.36) (-4.19) (-0.46) (5.39)
[95,99%] -0.48 -0.18 0.22 -0.60 -0.31 0.26 -0.37 -0.17 0.31
(-4.21) (-1.01) (2.14) (-6.42) (-1.74) (2.25) (-4.00) (-1.46) (2.68)
[99,100%] -0.09 0.15 0.55 -0.08 0.12 0.35 -0.20 0.12 0.36
(-1.29) (3.49) (2.96) (-0.81) (2.66) (1.56) (-1.26) (1.46) (2.44)
All ﬁrms -0.52 -0.09 0.50 -0.63 -0.21 0.41 -0.54 -0.15 0.38
(-5.41) (-0.92) (7.49) (-7.52) (-1.93) (4.44) (-8.61) (-2.17) (6.28)
∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1
[0,25%] 0.25 0.92 0.21 0.29 0.94 0.20 0.25 0.93 0.18
(4.54) (46.90) (2.18) (6.65) (55.16) (2.12) (4.32) (109.92) (1.75)
[0,50%] 0.43 0.94 0.22 0.45 0.94 0.21 0.39 0.92 0.25
(6.93) (42.53) (1.87) (7.87) (43.17) (1.83) (5.74) (16.70) (1.59)
[0,75%] 0.29 0.86 0.34 0.31 0.86 0.33 0.27 0.82 0.27
(3.19) (10.75) (3.13) (3.37) (9.90) (3.06) (2.85) (3.71) (2.72)
[0,99%] -0.41 0.24 0.51 -0.55 0.21 0.47 -0.43 0.31 0.42
(-5.54) (2.55) (5.95) (-7.85) (2.42) (6.54) (-2.27) (1.99) (7.26)
[90,95%] -0.06 0.21 0.09 -0.21 0.16 0.10 -0.12 0.16 0.11
(-0.31) (2.04) (0.89) (-1.61) (1.09) (0.79) (-0.67) (1.47) (0.93)
[95,99%] -0.12 -0.03 0.29 -0.41 0.03 0.23 -0.32 0.19 0.44
(-0.78) (-0.15) (2.24) (-3.35) (0.28) (1.00) (-1.73) (2.06) (4.67)
[99,100%] -0.12 0.26 0.21 -0.17 0.27 0.03 -0.13 0.49 0.04
(-1.30) (1.94) (0.71) (-2.35) (1.57) (0.10) (-0.62) (3.50) (0.17)
All ﬁrms -0.43 0.16 0.39 -0.60 0.06 0.31 -0.42 0.29 0.27
(-4.96) (1.73) (3.94) (-6.19) (0.77) (2.22) (-2.86) (1.65) (3.05)
Notes: Real GDP is logged and HP ﬁltered. All other series are HP ﬁltered only. Sale of stock is sale of
company stock (salstk). Net sale of stock is sale of company stock minus repurchase of company stock
(repstk). Change in equity is the change in book value of equity (see text for deﬁnition). The standard
errors are computed using the VARHAC procedure in den Haan and Levin (1997) and t-statistics are
in parenthesis. The correlation coeﬃcients statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance
level are highlighted in bold.
21Table 4: Cyclical behavior of debt issuance: level approach
Size classes ∆ bank debt and Net LT debt and ∆ in liabilities and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] 0.00 -0.28 -0.54 0.31 0.04 -0.12 0.36 -0.03 -0.47
(0.03) (-4.14) (-7.43) (3.02) (0.28) (-1.12) (3.06) (-0.25) (-3.41)
[0,50%] 0.62 0.18 -0.29 0.35 0.01 -0.37 0.38 -0.01 -0.28
(4.36) (0.78) (-1.60) (2.40) (0.07) (-2.43) (2.01) (-0.04) (-1.80)
[0,75%] 0.56 0.46 -0.03 0.36 0.07 -0.36 0.46 0.30 -0.17
(6.86) (5.26) (-0.15) (1.80) (0.52) (-2.56) (3.56) (2.37) (-0.87)
[0,99%] 0.64 0.39 -0.13 0.15 -0.34 -0.66 0.40 0.13 -0.36
(9.63) (4.54) (-0.89) (1.38) (-4.51) (-6.56) (6.26) (1.07) (-2.14)
[90,95%] 0.47 0.14 -0.60 0.05 -0.25 -0.50 0.32 0.09 -0.42
(9.68) (1.44) (-6.94) (0.34) (-2.85) (-5.10) (1.69) (0.57) (-2.73)
[95,99%] 0.47 0.40 0.31 0.11 -0.45 -0.71 0.28 0.04 -0.36
(4.49) (2.59) (1.78) (1.18) (-5.76) (-6.74) (4.36) (0.19) (-2.73)
[99,100%] 0.43 0.11 -0.30 0.12 -0.26 -0.70 0.51 0.22 -0.14
(1.78) (1.36) (-1.54) (1.34) (-3.00) (-5.17) (2.27) (1.88) (-1.08)
All ﬁrms 0.73 0.34 -0.29 0.15 -0.31 -0.69 0.53 0.21 -0.29
(7.90) (2.72) (-1.74) (1.55) (-5.02) (-6.37) (2.97) (1.60) (-1.64)
Size classes ∆ in bank debt and Net LT debt and ∆ in liabilities and
∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1
[0,25%] 0.42 0.30 -0.21 0.49 0.72 0.25 0.54 0.68 0.16
(4.02) (1.58) (-1.16) (8.18) (3.06) (1.29) (5.74) (3.10) (0.72)
[0,50%] 0.56 0.73 0.21 0.45 0.69 0.13 0.49 0.77 0.20
(2.93) (19.84) (2.14) (3.50) (9.54) (1.78) (3.54) (20.05) (5.17)
[0,75%] 0.45 0.77 0.32 0.61 0.67 -0.13 0.59 0.86 0.16
(2.22) (8.24) (1.79) (5.02) (27.41) (-1.48) (3.93) (29.70) (0.89)
[0,99%] 0.29 0.76 0.34 0.37 0.53 -0.36 0.37 0.89 0.01
(3.07) (9.05) (2.62) (3.49) (4.75) (-4.26) (1.76) (20.88) (0.07)
[90,95%] -0.06 0.65 -0.10 0.23 0.68 -0.29 0.21 0.93 -0.00
(-0.35) (7.97) (-1.21) (2.38) (9.77) (-2.43) (1.12) (58.30) (-0.01)
[95,99%] 0.10 0.49 0.30 0.42 0.43 -0.24 0.34 0.89 -0.06
(0.97) (3.25) (3.58) (4.15) (5.78) (-2.57) (1.95) (54.64) (-0.49)
[99,100%] 0.51 0.74 0.44 0.26 0.24 -0.21 0.71 0.99 0.66
(7.19) (10.12) (2.46) (1.57) (3.77) (-2.93) (18.51) (103.94) (12.49)
All ﬁrms 0.51 0.84 0.43 0.37 0.46 -0.24 0.63 0.96 0.40
(2.96) (14.41) (2.65) (2.70) (6.68) (-2.30) (5.52) (118.23) (4.36)
Notes: All series are logged and HP ﬁltered. Change in bank debt is the change in bank indebt-
ness (bankin) between year t and t − 1. Net long-term debt is increase in debt/advances (incdbt) minus
reduction in debt/advances (reddbt). Change in liabilities is the change in total liabilities (totlia) between
year t and t−1. The standard errors are computed using the VARHAC procedure in den Haan and Levin
(1997) and t-statistics are in parenthesis. The correlation coeﬃcients statistically diﬀerent from zero at
the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level are highlighted in bold.
22Table 5: Cyclical behavior of debt issuance: ﬂow approach
Size classes ∆ bank debt and Net LT debt and ∆ in liabilities and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] 0.27 0.35 0.06 0.33 0.16 0.11 0.38 0.51 0.22
(3.34) (2.45) (1.15) (2.71) (1.06) (0.94) (4.44) (3.59) (3.35)
[0,50%] 0.47 0.53 -0.03 0.37 0.46 0.01 0.42 0.39 0.09
(2.39) (3.58) (-0.11) (2.91) (3.73) (0.05) (1.11) (2.25) (0.38)
[0,75%] 0.10 0.59 0.36 0.29 0.54 0.08 0.11 0.57 0.27
(0.75) (4.67) (2.48) (1.28) (5.02) (0.38) (0.40) (3.44) (1.32)
[0,99%] 0.23 0.59 0.35 0.61 0.45 -0.36 0.26 0.57 0.16
(1.48) (3.37) (2.46) (8.00) (5.22) (-3.01) (1.81) (2.99) (1.43)
[90,95%] 0.25 0.65 -0.06 0.35 0.40 -0.30 0.16 0.59 0.24
(3.40) (4.53) (-0.93) (2.34) (5.14) (-2.10) (1.00) (6.47) (1.18)
[95,99%] 0.14 0.20 0.44 0.67 0.37 -0.45 0.23 0.38 0.02
(0.80) (1.85) (2.97) (16.05) (4.24) (-4.66) (2.14) (1.71) (0.14)
[99,100%] 0.33 0.53 -0.24 0.34 0.47 -0.33 0.38 0.60 -0.04
(2.56) (3.20) (-1.59) (8.59) (7.95) (-2.35) (3.65) (6.40) (-0.34)
All ﬁrms 0.35 0.74 0.19 0.56 0.48 -0.35 0.39 0.67 0.08
(4.54) (6.65) (1.12) (12.53) (7.25) (-2.51) (3.53) (6.30) (0.67)
Size classes ∆ in bank debt and Net LT debt and ∆ in liabilities and
∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1
[0,25%] 0.26 0.58 0.14 0.19 0.59 0.05 0.23 0.70 0.05
(1.53) (2.97) (1.17) (1.36) (4.50) (0.56) (0.96) (5.28) (0.49)
[0,50%] 0.49 0.50 0.21 0.45 0.53 0.23 0.47 0.68 0.24
(5.50) (8.05) (2.52) (8.97) (5.40) (2.90) (5.27) (6.91) (6.76)
[0,75%] 0.30 0.62 0.29 0.69 0.63 -0.06 0.55 0.83 0.16
(3.58) (4.72) (4.37) (12.91) (10.06) (-1.40) (13.77) (16.34) (3.42)
[0,99%] 0.28 0.79 0.18 0.68 0.46 -0.38 0.32 0.93 -0.12
(3.93) (8.61) (2.88) (14.08) (5.50) (-6.13) (4.15) (37.93) (-1.20)
[90,95%] 0.08 0.63 0.03 0.32 0.68 -0.28 0.21 0.95 0.09
(1.16) (4.77) (0.30) (2.90) (16.06) (-6.87) (2.75) (83.28) (1.85)
[95,99%] 0.09 0.37 -0.09 0.52 0.33 -0.39 -0.05 0.95 -0.41
(0.45) (3.31) (-0.39) (5.78) (4.07) (-2.34) (-0.34) (46.13) (-5.68)
[99,100%] 0.12 0.70 -0.13 0.12 0.50 -0.29 -0.00 0.98 -0.19
(0.69) (9.16) (-0.61) (2.05) (7.96) (-5.63) (-0.02) (222.21) (-0.77)
All ﬁrms 0.28 0.79 0.11 0.56 0.51 -0.40 0.25 0.96 -0.12
(5.50) (12.54) (0.86) (28.50) (7.38) (-7.40) (3.72) (193.91) (-1.79)
Notes: Real GDP is logged and HP ﬁltered. All other series are HP ﬁltered only. Change in bank debt
is the change in bank indebtness (bankin) between year t and t − 1. Net long-term debt is increase in
debt/advances (incdbt) minus reduction in debt/advances (reddbt). Change in liabilities is the change in
total liabilities (totlia) between year t and t − 1. The standard errors are computed using the VARHAC
procedure in den Haan and Levin (1997) and t-statistics are in parenthesis. The correlation coeﬃcients
statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level are highlighted in bold.
23Table 6: Co-movement of equity and debt
Level Approach
Size classes
Sale of stock and Net sale of stock ∆ in Equity and
∆ in bank debt and Net LT debt ∆ in Liabilities
∆Bt−1 ∆Bt ∆Bt+1 ∆Dt−1 ∆Dt ∆Dt+1 ∆Lt−1 ∆Lt ∆Lt+1
[0,25%] -0.22 0.10 0.32 0.15 0.58 0.45 -0.05 0.43 0.41
(-0.82) (0.48) (2.96) (0.66) (2.52) (6.55) (-0.19) (1.80) (2.85)
[0,50%] 0.33 0.60 0.58 0.28 0.59 0.52 0.36 0.68 0.49
(6.23) (12.67) (2.68) (5.59) (7.42) (4.05) (7.34) (20.88) (1.60)
[0,75%] 0.18 0.60 0.75 -0.20 0.30 0.67 0.05 0.62 0.70
(2.20) (3.44) (5.20) (-5.05) (4.13) (8.44) (0.62) (11.56) (6.75)
[0,99%] -0.34 0.03 0.47 -0.34 -0.37 -0.44 -0.31 0.04 0.22
(-3.39) (0.15) (1.43) (-2.63) (-2.01) (-3.50) (-2.26) (0.39) (1.17)
[90,95%] -0.14 -0.06 0.18 0.00 0.01 -0.31 -0.01 0.10 -0.04
(-2.63) (-1.04) (0.82) (0.02) (0.10) (-5.50) (-0.11) (1.66) (-0.21)
[95,99%] -0.17 0.03 0.50 -0.29 -0.53 -0.74 -0.32 -0.02 0.22
(-1.10) (0.14) (2.85) (-5.91) (-4.75) (-11.04) (-1.85) (-0.23) (1.55)
[99,100%] 0.35 0.20 0.17 0.05 -0.06 -0.34 0.70 0.77 0.57
(3.58) (1.72) (0.76) (0.60) (-0.48) (-1.48) (6.43) (13.46) (15.30)
All ﬁrms -0.24 0.05 0.48 -0.33 -0.44 -0.55 0.14 0.39 0.53
(-3.27) (0.82) (5.07) (-3.66) (-3.31) (-3.75) (0.75) (2.68) (4.77)
Flow Approach
Size classes
Sale of stock and Net sale of stock ∆ in Equity and
∆ in bank debt and Net LT debt ∆ in Liabilities
∆Bt−1 ∆Bt ∆Bt+1 ∆Dt−1 ∆Dt ∆Dt+1 ∆Lt−1 ∆Lt ∆Lt+1
[0,25%] 0.13 0.36 0.21 0.15 0.48 0.09 0.02 0.51 0.16
(0.92) (2.16) (2.18) (1.51) (2.67) (1.10) (0.24) (4.59) (1.30)
[0,50%] 0.24 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.36 0.23 0.24 0.42 0.21
(3.14) (4.77) (1.45) (3.37) (3.03) (3.57) (1.54) (2.72) (1.00)
[0,75%] 0.10 0.25 0.29 -0.11 0.29 0.42 0.01 0.45 0.36
(2.40) (1.73) (0.49) (-3.25) (4.42) (2.75) (0.17) (4.05) (2.68)
[0,99%] -0.09 -0.06 0.52 -0.44 -0.33 0.01 -0.46 0.06 0.39
(-0.88) (-0.60) (4.26) (-5.12) (-1.41) (0.12) (-3.57) (0.39) (8.90)
[90,95%] -0.12 -0.13 0.07 -0.13 0.01 -0.26 0.02 -0.03 0.07
(-1.16) (-2.84) (0.73) (-1.91) (0.30) (-2.74) (0.11) (-0.39) (0.55)
[95,99%] 0.11 -0.15 0.30 -0.34 -0.37 -0.01 -0.30 -0.02 0.43
(0.40) (-0.94) (3.01) (-3.42) (-2.11) (-0.04) (-1.73) (-0.48) (4.63)
[99,100%] 0.13 -0.19 0.19 -0.11 -0.20 0.23 -0.13 0.41 0.07
(2.03) (-1.21) (0.67) (-1.93) (-1.03) (1.05) (-0.57) (2.26) (0.36)
All ﬁrms -0.26 -0.11 0.53 -0.47 -0.40 -0.04 -0.44 0.12 0.25
(-2.87) (-2.48) (10.44) (-5.49) (-3.61) (-0.39) (-3.39) (0.64) (2.72)
24Table 7: Cyclical behavior of retained earnings, proﬁts and dividends: ﬂow approach
Size classes Retained earnings and Proﬁts and Dividends and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] -0.12 0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.13 0.27 0.42 0.25
(-1.71) (0.72) (0.11) (-0.53) (-0.07) (0.87) (2.81) (13.37) (2.33)
[0,50%] -0.13 0.37 0.34 -0.16 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.02
(-0.84) (1.83) (2.48) (-0.94) (1.75) (1.76) (3.82) (1.26) (0.11)
[0,75%] -0.23 0.25 0.34 -0.28 0.20 0.27 -0.11 0.24 0.32
(-1.03) (1.72) (1.38) (-1.22) (1.14) (1.50) (-2.03) (1.31) (1.67)
[0,99%] -0.23 0.56 0.67 -0.07 0.71 0.71 0.22 0.51 0.41
(-2.57) (6.87) (5.12) (-0.95) (8.39) (6.00) (5.36) (3.08) (3.90)
[90,95%] -0.09 0.67 0.58 0.04 0.75 0.60 0.37 0.58 0.29
(-1.29) (9.83) (8.24) (0.58) (3.67) (8.27) (5.42) (4.58) (1.53)
[95,99%] -0.08 0.59 0.55 -0.03 0.67 0.71 0.19 0.42 0.36
(-0.59) (6.24) (4.58) (-0.19) (8.41) (5.12) (3.99) (2.28) (3.25)
[99,100%] 0.02 0.61 0.52 -0.00 0.61 0.52 0.16 0.21 0.33
(0.33) (3.78) (4.55) (-0.02) (3.58) (4.97) (1.75) (1.60) (1.90)
All ﬁrms -0.16 0.60 0.64 -0.06 0.68 0.66 0.23 0.52 0.43
(-1.89) (4.90) (4.21) (-0.80) (5.85) (5.17) (4.83) (3.06) (3.79)
Size classes Retained earnings and Proﬁts and Dividends and
∆At−1 ∆ At ∆ At+1 ∆ At−1 ∆ At ∆ At+1 ∆ At−1 ∆ At ∆ At+1
[0,25%] -0.11 0.30 0.31 -0.18 0.38 0.63 0.30 0.38 -0.03
(-1.51) (2.00) (1.56) (-2.04) (4.56) (5.31) (2.32) (2.87) (-0.12)
[0,50%] 0.05 0.43 0.60 -0.10 0.39 0.71 -0.16 0.05 0.33
(0.50) (2.70) (5.61) (-1.53) (2.17) (9.06) (-1.51) (0.24) (1.49)
[0,75%] 0.10 0.58 0.66 0.10 0.68 0.67 -0.22 0.21 0.29
(1.38) (0.80) (4.22) (2.16) (6.38) (3.91) (-1.14) (1.43) (1.14)
[0,99%] -0.07 0.60 0.54 0.09 0.72 0.48 0.38 0.42 0.03
(-0.46) (7.97) (5.11) (0.63) (14.15) (4.29) (2.40) (5.00) (0.26)
[90,95%] 0.13 0.63 0.34 0.33 0.67 0.32 0.38 0.56 0.03
(0.79) (10.45) (5.97) (2.58) (14.00) (5.79) (6.70) (2.91) (0.31)
[95,99%] -0.26 0.47 0.38 -0.08 0.55 0.40 0.25 0.40 -0.18
(-1.16) (4.17) (2.04) (-0.42) (7.29) (2.28) (1.97) (5.23) (-2.41)
[99,100%] -0.27 0.63 0.47 -0.19 0.58 0.55 0.15 0.27 0.22
(-2.18) (8.65) (3.72) (-1.44) (12.80) (4.75) (1.02) (3.85) (1.35)
All ﬁrms -0.18 0.67 0.63 -0.04 0.74 0.63 0.31 0.49 0.19
(-1.57) (16.00) (7.24) (-0.34) (26.38) (6.20) (3.19) (7.53) (2.16)
Notes: Real GDP is logged and HP ﬁltered. All other series are HP ﬁltered only. Assets is total
assets (totlas). Proﬁts is income before extraordinary items (incbei). Retained earnings includes
appropriated and unappropriated retained earnings (retear). Dividends is total dividends (divtot).
The standard errors are computed using the VARHAC procedure in den Haan and Levin (1997)
and t-statistics are in parenthesis. The correlation coeﬃcients statistically diﬀerent from zero at
the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level are highlighted in bold.
25Table 8: Cyclical behavior of leverage: level approach
Size classes Liabilities/A and Debt/A and LT Debt/A and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] 0.45 0.14 -0.01 0.42 0.09 -0.02 0.42 0.19 0.01
(2.53) (1.50) (-0.05) (2.24) (0.65) (-0.12) (3.31) (2.40) (0.05)
[0,50%] 0.21 0.01 -0.30 0.29 -0.06 -0.42 0.17 -0.24 -0.37
(1.80) (0.03) (-1.17) (3.69) (-0.44) (-2.43) (1.49) (-1.60) (-3.42)
[0,75%] 0.13 -0.04 -0.39 0.38 0.22 -0.46 0.15 0.10 -0.48
(1.26) (-0.20) (-1.79) (3.77) (2.77) (-2.50) (2.08) (1.09) (-2.01)
[0,99%] -0.00 -0.36 -0.47 -0.02 -0.39 -0.48 -0.16 -0.48 -0.47
(-0.03) (-1.53) (-3.16) (-0.10) (-4.15) (-2.49) (-0.77) (-6.12) (-2.34)
[90,95%] 0.14 -0.34 -0.53 0.10 -0.41 -0.76 -0.05 -0.48 -0.70
(1.46) (-3.16) (-7.93) (1.04) (-3.61) (-14.17) (-0.50) (-5.64) (-11.62)
[95,99%] -0.21 -0.33 -0.29 -0.25 -0.31 -0.12 -0.29 -0.33 -0.15
(-1.37) (-1.79) (-1.82) (-1.41) (-3.19) (-0.79) (-1.69) (-4.12) (-0.98)
[99,100%] 0.08 -0.36 -0.73 0.49 -0.10 -0.47 0.43 -0.14 -0.47
(0.51) (-6.17) (-9.91) (2.32) (-1.10) (-3.79) (1.86) (-1.52) (-3.84)
All ﬁrms 0.06 -0.43 -0.72 0.39 -0.21 -0.51 0.28 -0.30 -0.51
(0.37) (-2.67) (-8.11) (3.85) (-2.78) (-2.20) (2.93) (-3.55) (-2.04)
Size classes Liabilities/A and Debt/A and LT Debt/A and
∆At−1 ∆ At ∆ At+1 ∆ At−1 ∆ At ∆ At+1 ∆ At−1 ∆ At ∆ At+1
[0,25%] 0.12 -0.17 -0.25 0.14 -0.01 -0.18 0.06 0.03 -0.10
(1.07) (-0.72) (-0.93) (0.69) (-0.05) (-0.59) (0.28) (0.15) (-0.37)
[0,50%] -0.35 -0.64 -0.47 -0.11 -0.39 -0.44 -0.12 -0.32 -0.44
(-2.77) (-2.68) (-3.04) (-0.82) (-5.19) (-3.08) (-4.69) (-3.18) (-3.30)
[0,75%] -0.17 -0.49 -0.63 0.24 -0.00 -0.44 0.15 -0.07 -0.49
(-1.00) (-4.81) (-8.59) (1.36) (-0.03) (-11.27) (1.28) (-0.47) (-3.19)
[0,99%] 0.32 0.26 -0.47 0.27 0.15 -0.44 0.20 -0.00 -0.54
(2.32) (1.87) (-5.11) (3.19) (0.89) (-5.94) (2.11) (-0.01) (-7.04)
[90,95%] 0.16 0.29 -0.10 0.10 0.32 -0.48 0.06 0.14 -0.56
(0.94) (2.06) (-0.46) (0.69) (1.46) (-2.28) (0.42) (0.65) (-3.20)
[95,99%] 0.34 0.39 -0.31 0.48 -0.04 -0.39 0.48 -0.07 -0.40
(2.24) (5.20) (-2.76) (9.22) (-0.39) (-5.94) (8.15) (-0.64) (-5.11)
[99,100%] -0.14 -0.24 -0.64 0.50 0.58 0.36 0.49 0.55 0.33
(-1.46) (-1.54) (-15.21) (6.55) (3.40) (1.74) (6.15) (3.16) (1.54)
All ﬁrms 0.25 0.04 -0.68 0.57 0.50 -0.01 0.54 0.41 -0.11
(2.43) (0.32) (-8.67) (3.46) (2.81) (-0.13) (3.66) (2.47) (-0.99)
Notes: Real GDP and assets are logged and HP ﬁltered. The various deﬁnitions of leverage are
HP ﬁltered only. Liabilities is total liabilities (totlia). Assets is total assets (totlas). Debt is bank
indebtness (bankin) plus debt and advances (dbtadv). Long-term debt is debt and advances (db-
tadv). The standard errors are computed using the VARHAC procedure in den Haan and Levin
(1997) and t-statistics are in parenthesis. The correlation coeﬃcients statistically diﬀerent from
zero at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level are highlighted in bold.
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